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IMF supported programs have conventionally been assessed by examining their 
effects on intermediate variables and final outcomes. More recently greater attention 
has been paid to implementation on the assumption that in order to work programs 
need to be implemented. Empirical studies have begun to include political economy 
variables in an attempt to explain implementation. They have used the concept of 
‘ownership’ to provide a theoretical foundation. This paper provides an alternative 
conceptual framework based on the marginal benefits and costs of implementation. It 
goes on to discuss policies that might be expected to improve implementation based 
on this framework.  
JEL: F32, F33 
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The International Monetary Fund exercises a pervasive influence over economic 
policy in many developing and emerging economies. The influence is at its greatest 
when governments turn to the Fund for direct financial assistance. This may be 
forthcoming under different lending facilities but will be conditional on the agreement 
and then the implementation of a program of policy reform.
1 There is a large literature 
examining the design and impact of IMF conditionality and, as one might anticipate, 
considerable debate about the extent to which Fund-backed programs work.
2  
However, a more recent trend in the literature has been to examine the circumstances 
under which programs are or are not implemented. 
3 
 
This concern over implementation is apposite. In order for IMF programs to exert a 
beneficial influence over economic performance one might suppose that two 
conditions have to be met. First, they have to be well-designed. Second, they have to 
be implemented. 
4 While early research on conditionality focused on the economic 
design of programs and their impact on intermediate policy variables and ultimate 
economic outcomes, there was little or no attempt to distinguish between those 
programs that were carried through to completion and those that were not. This is a 
important shortcoming, especially when evidence suggests that a large number of 
programs remain uncompleted (Mussa and Savastano, 2000). A logical next step is 
therefore to try and understand what factors determine the degree of implementation. 
   4
Early on, the Fund attributed poor implementation to a 'lack of political will' on behalf 
of the governments concerned. But, from a policy point of view, this does not get us 
very far unless we also understand what factors determine political will. Other studies 
were therefore critical of the lack of precision and attempted to analyse why 
governments might sign an agreement but then fail to implement it (Bird, 1998, 
2002). They did this by examining the evolution of the costs and benefits involved. At 
the margin, a government may rationally discontinue a program where the costs of 
continuing to implement it are perceived to outweigh the benefits. The costs and 
benefits will have a political dimension and implementation therefore needs to be 
viewed in the context of domestic political economy. 
 
Meanwhile, similar ideas found expression in the concept of 'ownership'. 
5Governments are more likely to implement programs that they own, and are more 
likely to abandon programs that they feel have been imposed upon them and which 
they have been coerced to follow by their immediate needs for external finance.  
 
However 'ownership', rather like 'political will', is difficult to measure and impossible 
to quantity with any precision. It is necessary, therefore, to look behind ownership and 
examine the variables that influence a government's commitment to a particular 
program of policy reform and its ability to implement it within an evolving domestic 
political environment. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework within which the 
determinants of implementation may be analysed. The framework suggested differs 
from that offered elsewhere which focuses on ownership and the role of conditionality 
in constraining those opposed to economic reform. Indeed, the analysis in this paper   5
suggests that there is an important distinction to be made between ownership and 
implementation. Since a policy objective is to increase the degree to which programs 
supported by the IMF are implemented by the governments that sign up to them, the 
paper also explores the implications of the conceptual framework for policy.  
 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines alternative ways of 
measuring implementation. It briefly investigates the record on implementation and 
assesses the extent to which the failure to implement programs is a problem that 
policy needs to address. Section 3 briefly examines the literature on implementation, 
much of which is empirical in nature. Section 4 constructs a conceptual framework 
within which implementation may be analysed.  Section 5 builds on this framework to 
examine the implications for the design of IMF programs.  Finally, Section 6 offers 
some concluding remarks that place the proposals in the context of current reform 
within the IMF. 
 
2. IMPLEMENTATION: MEASUREMENT AND RECORD 
 
 
 Measuring implementation 
 
 
Measuring the implementation of IMF-backed programs is far from straightforward. 
The most convenient and widely used measure is the proportion of committed 
resources that are disbursed, or the rate of completion (Killick, 1995, Mussa and 
Savastano, 2000, and Bird 2002). An advantage of this approach is that it provides 
continuous data. However, there are problems with it. Resources may not always be 
drawn on in spite of the fact that economic policy reform is undertaken. Indeed, a 
'failure' to complete a program in terms of the disbursement of resources may reflect   6
economic 'success' in the sense that finance from the IMF is no longer required. Some 
programs agreed with the Fund will be precautionary or will turn precautionary and in 
these cases there is no intention to draw resources from the Fund; it would therefore 
be inappropriate to evaluate them in terms of disbursements relative to commitments. 
In contrast, a program may be completed in the sense of using all the agreed resources 
in spite of a government failing to fully implement all the conditions originally laid 
down. The IMF may feel that substantial progress has been made and may allow 
modest deviations from targets to be accommodated through the use of waivers or 
modifications to the initial program. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s another measure of implementation has become 
feasible as the IMF has collected data in the form of its MONA database (Monitoring 
Fund Arrangements) on the extent to which both the macroeconomic and structural 
conditions stipulated within programs are implemented. This allows an index of 
implementation to be constructed. However, there are again problems with this 
measure; it only covers programs that come up for review by the Executive Board and 
therefore excludes those that are cancelled permanently or interrupted. Since it may 
be assumed that it will be in these programs that implementation is likely to be at its 
weakest, the MONA data will have an upward bias towards implementation. 
Moreover, there is only a limited amount of data as yet. 
 
Other measures of implementation focus on whether programs are interrupted either 
reversibly or irreversibly. Reversible interruption is where a review of a program is 
delayed, perhaps by three months in the case of stand-bys or six months in the case of 
Extended Fund Facility and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility credits, but the   7
program is subsequently revived. Irreversible interruption is where scheduled reviews 
are not completed or, even if they are, the instalments of the arrangement are not 
approved. This measure of implementation does not, however, tell us whether an 
interrupted program is replaced by another one. Moreover, it does not provide 
continuous data and only allows programs to be classified as uninterrupted, reversibly 
interrupted or irreversibly interrupted. Even so, it does usefully complement the 
implementation index based on the MONA database by capturing cases where 
programs are interrupted and, as a result, not subject to further review by the 
Executive Board. 
 
Although these four measures of implementation have been found to be significantly 
mutually correlated with one another (Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayiatos, 
2003) the correlation coefficients tend not to be very high, suggesting that the 
measures are picking up different dimensions of implementation. This needs to be 
borne in mind when comparing studies that use different measures. 
  What is the record on implementation? 
 
Data presented by Mussa and Savastano (2000) provide information about the 
completion rate of IMF programs or the ratio of disbursements to commitments. 
Throughout 1973-1997 only about 35 per cent of arrangements were fully disbursed. 
 
Using the interruption measure, Ivanova et al (2003) report that in the period between 
1992 and 1998, 44 per cent of all programs experienced an irreversible interruption, 
while 70 per cent experienced either a major or a minor interruption. They also report 
that the average implementation index for programs based on the MONA data was 76   8
per cent, with the macro implementation index at 80 per cent being significantly 
higher than the structural implementation index at 67 per cent.  Nsouli, Atoian and 
Mourmouras (2004) update the information provided by Ivanova et al (2003) to cover 
the period 1992-2002. Although, according to this more recent data, the interruption 
rate appears to have fallen slightly and the disbursement rate to have risen, the more 
recent sample contains more stand-by arrangements which tend to have fewer 
interruptions than EFF and PRGF programs. In any event, and according to all the 
measures, the failure to fully implement programs is quite widespread. To what extent 
is this a cause for concern? 
 
Implementation will be important if it is via conditionality that the beneficial 
economic effects of IMF programs are derived. It would be difficult to justify 
conditionality and the related costs of negotiating it, in circumstances where it made 
little difference whether or not it was implemented. Indeed, in these circumstances the 
size of the loan and the signal transmitted by the size of IMF lending might appear to 
be more important aspects of IMF programs.
6 But, if it is the announcement rather 
than the implementation of programs that appears to have a beneficial effect on capital 
flows, it is reasonable to question whether such announcement effects reflect a belief 
that programs will be implemented. If so, then, in the long run, positive 
announcement effects are unlikely to survive a record of poor implementation. 
 
What does the evidence say about the importance of implementation? It is mixed 
(Killick, 1995, Conway, 1994, Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskoya, 2000, Ivanova et 
al, 2003, Baqir et al, 2003, Chen and Thomas, 2003, Nsouli et al, 2004, and Dreher, 
2004). Focusing on some of the more recent studies, Nsouli, Atoian and Mourmouras   9
(2004) discover that implementation exerts an independent influence over 
macroeconomic outcomes especially over shorter time horizons. They claim that 
better implemented programs are associated with lower inflation, and with initially 
weaker but then stronger balance of payments and fiscal outcomes. They find no 
statistically significant impact of implementation on economic growth. Chen and 
Thomas (2003) find that programs that are stopped are associated with faster inflation 
and larger budget deficits. They also find that completed programs exert a marginal 
positive effect on economic growth but not until three years after the programs have 
ended. Still focusing on economic growth, Dreher (2004) finds that IMF programs are 
generally associated with reduced rates of economic growth, but he also finds weak 
evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this effect. In a later paper 
(Dreher, 2005) he finds that implementation has some positive effect on monetary and 
fiscal policy. In any event, it can hardly be the case that the IMF negotiates 
conditionality believing that its implementation is irrelevant. If the Fund has decided 
to stick with conditionality as a modality for encouraging economic reform, it must 
also concern itself with the implementation of conditionality and with ways of 
improving the record reported above. In order to design policy to improve 
implementation we initially need to understand the factors that influence it. A 
subsequent section therefore goes on to provide an informal conceptual framework 
within which the determinants of implementation may be identified and discussed. 




3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The literature on the implementation of IMF-supported programs is currently quite 
sparse. Most of it attempts to identify factors that are statistically significant in large 
sample econometric exercises, although there are also case studies that attempt to 
tease out more nuanced accounts of implementation. Relatively few contributions 
analyse implementation from a theoretical perspective (exceptions include Mayer and 
Mourmouras, 2002, 2005, Drazen, 2002, and Khan and Sharma, 2001). Those that do, 
commonly adopt a game theoretic approach in which IMF conditionality is used to 
constrain or influence ‘veto players’ who are in a position to disrupt the process of 
economic reform.  The implication is that, with powerful opposition forces aligned 
against them, governments will find it more difficult to implement reform than where 
the opposition is weak. This suggests that implementation is a political economy 
phenomenon. A useful review of IMF conditionality and implementation in the 
context of the theory of special interest politics may be found in Mayer and 
Mourmouras (2005). 
 
To date perhaps the most comprehensive single study of the implementation of IMF 
programs has been conducted by Ivanova et al (2003). They analyse the 
implementation of 170 programs approved between 1992 and 1998, using multiple 
measures of implementation in the form of reversible interruptions, irreversible 
interruptions, an overall index of implementation derived from the MONA database,   11
and the ratio of disbursements to commitments. They econometrically test the effects 
on implementation of political conditions in the borrowing country, IMF effort, 
conditionality and initial and external conditions by using Probit and Tobit models, 
instrumenting for other variables.  
 
They summarise their findings as follows: 'on the one hand, the implementation of 
IMF-supported programs is strongly influenced by recipient countries' domestic 
political economy. Strong special interests, lack of political cohesion, inefficient 
bureaucracies, and ethno-linguistic divisions are strongly associated with weak 
program implementation. The strong association between program implementation 
and political economy variables is robust across different econometric specifications. 
On the other hand, initial economic conditions, IMF effort and the breadth and depth 
of conditionality do not seem to materially influence program prospects when they are 
properly instrumented for.' (Ivanova et al, 2003, p4). In a more recent study Nsouli et 
al (2004) confirm the link between a country’s institutional and political environment 
and its implementation record. 
 
In stressing the overall significance of political economy variables, this research 
builds on and confirms earlier work which examined the success of World Bank 
programs, (Dollar and Svensson, 2000). In a similar vein, and based on a study of 
major interruptions in the context of 36 ESAF programs with the IMF, Mecagni 
(1999) discovers that they often depend on 'political disruptions serious enough to call 
into question the continuing authority of the government… the nature of political 
upheavals and the intensity of political and ethnic turmoil varied, but all cases were 
characterised by a severe reduction of the authorities' ability to commit credibly to 
and implement adjustment policies.’ (p9). Mecagni also finds some statistical   12
evidence to support the suggestion that the poor implementation of programs may be 
linked to external shocks such as export shortfalls or shortfalls in external financing; 
something also found by Killick (1995). 
 
While all these studies share the common theme that political variables are important 
when seeking to explain implementation, there are differences between them in terms 
of the precise nature of the relationships. For example, there are differences over the 
impact of a government’s length of tenure on implementation as well as on whether a 
democratic orientation makes any difference. While Ivanova et al (2003) find no 
statistical link, in another study of IMF program interruptions Thomas (2002) 
discovers that autocratic regimes have a better record of implementation. On the other 
hand, Joyce (2003) finds that democracy helps and that politically more open regimes 
have a superior record of implementation.  Using various measures of special interests 
within government, and unlike Ivanova et al, Joyce finds no statistically significant 
connection between them and implementation, nor does he find a link between the 
cohesion of the executive and legislative branches of government, and 
implementation. He does find that regimes that have been in power for longer are less 
likely to complete programs, and that recently elected governments are more likely to 
complete them. His results also suggest that open economies are more likely to 
complete programs, which he claims could suggest that proximity to the Fund's 
underlying economic paradigm is relevant. Finally he discovers that private capital 
inflows discourage implementation.  
 
There are some resonances between the findings reported by Joyce who examined 77 
programs over the period 1975-99, and those discovered by Dreher (2003) who 
examines program completion across 104 countries over the period 1975-98. Dreher   13
finds 'no robustly significant coefficients' when he tests for political explanations in 
terms of government fractionalisation, the political leaning of the chief executive's 
party, the existence of autonomous regions, the political power of the leader, the 
degree of political cohesion and various other political variables. He does, however, 
find some not completely robust evidence that IMF programs are more likely to be 
interrupted prior to elections, and that, while democratic regimes are generally 
associated with less compliance, the increase in the probability of interruption at 
election times is less severe in democracies. He also finds that initial economic 
conditions in the form of government consumption relative to GDP, short- term debt 
relative to GDP and GDP per capita exert a statistically significant effect on 
implementation. Interruptions appear to vary positively with the first two of these 
variables and negatively with the third. Ivanova et al (2003) also find some evidence 
based on bivariate correlations that implementation is affected by the severity of some 
initial conditions but, as noted earlier, this relationship loses statistical significance 
once political variables are included. Earlier research by Killick (1995) suggested that 
the degree to which programs are completed is positively related to the amount of 
finance provided by the Fund in relation to the size of the initial current account 
deficit, although Ivanova et al do not find a similar relationship when the size of the 
loan is expressed in relation to the borrowing country's quota. 
 
In addition to the econometric research, the literature contains a number of case 
studies that have a bearing on implementation. Some of these have been conducted by 
the Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department in the context of reviewing 
IMF conditionality (IMF, 2001). Others have been undertaken by the Independent 
Evaluation Office as part of its study of the prolonged use of IMF resources (IEO,   14
2002). Still others have been undertaken by outside academics; a good example being 
Stone’s analysis of the IMF’s involvement in countries in transition during the 1990s 
(Stone, 2002). 
 
While acknowledging the conventional methodological weaknesses of case studies, 
the mounting case study evidence does point to a range of factors as being potentially 
significant in explaining implementation, or the lack of it. These include: the severity 
of initial conditions, over ambition in terms of what programs might realistically be 
expected to achieve, the gap between the policy preferences of the country’s 
authorities and the IMF, the occurrence of unanticipated shocks, and political 
economy variables such as the involvement of the political leadership, the political 
strength of those opposed to reform, political stability, the quality of the bureaucracy 
and institutions, and the stage of the electoral cycle. Political scientists have, of 
course, long recognised the importance of political variables in the process of 
economic reform (see, for example, Nelson, 1990, Haggard and Kaufman, 1992, and 
Williamson, 1993). 
 
Although the empirical studies available exhibit some ambiguities and inconsistencies 
they all imply that political variables are important in terms of understanding the 
implementation of IMF conditionality. How then will governments reach a decision as 








Governments, it may be assumed, want to retain power. How can they best achieve 
this and how can involvement with the IMF help? Ultimately a government will stand 
a better chance of staying in office if it oversees a steady improvement in the national 
standard of living. To this end it will be anxious to encourage economic growth and 
avoid recession and unemployment. It will also be aware of distributional issues and 
will want to keep supporters on side and reduce the influence of powerful opposition 
groups. 
 
Faced with balance of payments deficits that are unsustainable because capital inflows 
are insufficient to finance current account deficits and because reserves are limited, 
governments will have to change policy. In such a situation supply-side adjustment 
may be insufficiently quick-acting; structural adjustment takes time to have its effects. 
Governments facing ebbing capital inflows and depleting international reserves will 
therefore be confronted with the prospect of exchange rate depreciation and 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy to reduce aggregate domestic demand. 
These are likely to be politically unpopular measures. The whole scenario may be 
magnified to crisis proportions where the outflow of capital is rapid. Governments 
may therefore be persuaded to turn to the IMF as a source of external capital and as a   16
means of crisis resolution. The Fund will to some extent provide resources itself, but, 
in principle, may also catalyse others to lend by endorsing an internationally 
acceptable program of economic reform. Additional capital inflows will enable 
governments to finance relatively larger current account deficits than would have 
been possible otherwise. In other words, in the short term, domestic living standards 
can be maintained at a higher level with IMF support than without it. Those 
disadvantaged by reform can be financially compensated, and the influence of 
powerful domestic opposition groups may be negated by involving the IMF.
7 
 
Why then do all governments not rush to borrow from the IMF? The thing is that 
there are perceived political costs as well. First, there is the loss of national 
sovereignty over the design of economic policy. By turning to the IMF governments 
that have been elected to run an economy are in effect ceding power to an unelected 
international agency. Second, involving the IMF is equivalent to an acknowledgement 
that previous policies have failed, and governments will surely be reluctant to 
welcome indicators of their own economic mismanagement. Third, governments may 
somewhat irrationally tend to compare the policies supported by the IMF and 
designed to correct balance of payments deficits with their own previous policies 
(rather than the policies that they would have to had implemented in the Fund’s 
absence). Fourth, even where they accept the binding nature of the balance of 
payments constraint and the need to strengthen the current account, governments may 
have preferred to opt for a different portfolio of policies than that favored by the 
Fund. They may, for example, have opted for protectionist commercial policy and for 
controls on capital outflows rather than for fiscal contraction and exchange rate 
devaluation.   17
 
In deciding whether or not to turn to the Fund, governments will therefore weigh up 
the benefits and costs as they perceive them. Rationally they will embark on a 
program only where the former outweigh the latter. Perceptions are crucial here since 
neither the benefits nor the costs can be measured in an objective and definitive way. 
What is the political pay-off to the government from being able to resolve an 
economic crisis? What is the political cost of ceding national sovereignty over the 
design of economic policy? These are impossible to quantify precisely. The important 
thing is what the government believes them to be. 
 
But it may also be quite rational from a government’s point of view to discontinue an 
IMF program that it willingly signed. Simply put, the reality of the benefits and costs 
may turn out to be different from those envisaged by the government at the outset of 
the program. Perceptions may prove inaccurate. Governments will only opt to 
continue with a program for as long as the perceived benefits of so doing at the 
margin exceed the costs. And perceptions will now be affected by experience with the 
program up to that point. While the Fund may encourage a government to stick with a 
program because, as the IMF sees it, full implementation will generate economic 
benefits, the government, concerned as it is with the domestic political consequences 
of the program, may view abandonment as a superior course of action given its own 
welfare function. 
 
It may also in principle be the case that the government envisaged discontinuing the 
program even at the moment of signing it. Reality may have matched perceptions. But 
the perception was that the benefits of the program would be derived quite quickly   18
and largely as a consequence of is announcement, while the perceived costs in terms 
of unpopular individual policies could be postponed until late in the program. The ex 
ante intent of non-implementation would then appear quite rational from the 
government’s viewpoint and it will renege on its commitments. 
 
In the conceptual framework developed in the rest of this section, the benefit from 
implementing an IMF program is the continuing access to IMF and related finance 
that in turn facilitates a less adjustment-intensive balance of payments strategy than 
would otherwise be available. The costs are related to conditionality, and take the 
form either of the sub-optimal design of individual policies as perceived by 
governments, or the loss of sovereignty over policy design. 
 
 The benefits of implementation 
 
  As illustrated in Figure 1 the benefit from negotiating a program with the Fund 
comes via the additional financial resources to which it gives rise, the less adjustment-
intensive balance of payments strategy that is facilitated, and the ability to 
compensate losers. Either these extra resources may be supplied directly by the Fund 
or they may come from the signalling effect of the program and its impact on other 
capital flows. The value of the benefit depends on the availability and cost of 
alternative sources of finance in the absence of the Fund program. Finance from the 
IMF becomes more valuable as the availability of finance from elsewhere declines. 
Since the first instalment of a loan from the Fund will be paid out at the outset of the 
program, the MB schedule in Figure 1 starts some way up the vertical axis. The shape 
of MB then depends on how the marginal benefit of the program changes over time   19
and with the degree of implementation; is this constant or does it rise or fall, and at 
what rate does it rise or fall? If, for example, the loan is front-end loaded, and if the 
catalytic effect is a function of the announcement of the program rather than its 
implementation, the MB schedule will have the features illustrated by MB1 in Figure 
1, starting relatively high up the vertical axis. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The relationship between the slope of MB and the size of the catalytic effect warrants 
further discussion. As noted above, the marginal benefit of a Fund program relates to 
the extent to which it generates additional financial flows. But what is the value added 
by or the marginal return to the IMF program? It is possible that the MB schedule 
could decline either in circumstances where the catalytic effect is absent, or where it 
is strong but depends only on the announcement of the program rather than its 
implementation. Where the strength of the catalytic effect depends on the degree of 
program implementation the MB schedule will be flatter (MB2) or may be upward 
sloping (MB3). 
 
Similar arguments to these may be expressed in a slightly different way. Countries 
turn to the IMF because their balance of payments has become a binding constraint 
upon their ability to achieve other objectives. The benefit of an IMF program is that 
this constraint is relaxed. The size of the benefit over time therefore depends on the 
extent to which the constraint is relaxed; it may be expressed in terms of the ability to 
better achieve other policy objectives. A balance of payments constraint is likely to be 
most effective in the midst of a BoP crisis when foreign exchange carries a high   20
shadow price. As the crisis eases, so the BoP constraint also eases. Given this pattern, 
the marginal benefit from an IMF program will be at its highest at the outset of the 
program; it will gradually decline over time as balance of payments problems are 
overcome. Again the MB schedule may be expected to be downward sloping, and 
may even decline at an increasing rate, (MB4). 
 
Three other observations may be made about the MB schedule at this point. First, 
governments may sometimes worry that turning to the IMF for assistance will have an 
adverse effect on their market access because a negative signal is transmitted 
suggesting that the economy is in difficulty. The catalytic effect may be negative. A 
government that still has some access to private markets may believe that the resulting 
reduction in capital flows will exceed the additional credit coming from the IMF. 
Although some adjustment will need to be made for the terms associated with the 
alternative types of capital, the end result may be that the government believes that 
the net result of announcing a program with the IMF on capital inflows will be 
negative. In these circumstances the MB schedule will start at a point below the 
horizontal axis in Figure 1 (such as MB5). The benefits will be negative. Unless the 
government also believes that the implementation of the program will nonetheless 
have a strong positive effect on private capital inflows, there would be little point in 
entering into an agreement with the Fund, since the expectation would be that the 
short run external financing constraint would become more binding as a result. 
 
Second, since IMF loans are disbursed in instalments, technically the MB schedule 
will decline in a stepwise fashion with the benefits falling after the receipt of each 
tranche of the loan. The benefit from further implementation then remains in part the   21
option of drawing on subsequent instalments. This would of course not be the case for 
the final tranche, implying that the marginal benefit of implementation following the 
final tranche falls to zero if we abstract from the catalytic effect. This has policy 
implications to which we return when we examine replacement programs. 
 
Third, it is important to emphasise the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of 
economic performance, let alone the political returns to enhanced economic 
performance. Ex post benefits from agreeing to a program with the IMF may fail to 
match ex ante expectations. For example, at the time a program is negotiated it may 
be expected that its implementation will have a positive effect on other capital flows. 
If this effect is not forthcoming, or is muted, the actual MB schedule (MB
a) will lie 




 The costs of implementation 
 
Let us now turn to the marginal costs of an IMF program as illustrated by the MC 
schedules in Figure 2.  The cost of an IMF program, as perceived by the government 
that negotiates it, may be seen in terms of the conditionality involved. Governments 
would generally prefer unconditional financial support. It may be assumed that there 
will be a discrepancy between the policies preferred by the government and those 
preferred by the IMF; their objective functions will differ. A government will be 
aiming to stay in power and may want to protect the near-term standard of living as 
much as possible; it will be seeking to minimise the consumption costs of adjustment 
and may be concerned about the distributional effects of policies. The IMF, on the 
other hand, will be seeking to achieve near-term balance of payments adjustment and   22
may be expected to emphasise macroeconomic stabilisation. In a sense, the balance of 
payments is a constraint on achieving other objectives as far as a government is 
concerned but is an objective in itself for the IMF. The Fund will tend to be much less 
concerned about the domestic political repercussions of policies. Either as a 
consequence of its own institutionally preferred economic paradigm, based perhaps 
on a scientific evaluation of the evidence, or its agency role, representing the interests 
of its principal shareholders, the IMF may prefer policies of economic liberalisation 
and openness that do not necessarily accord with governmental preferences. The 
bigger the gap between the policy preferences of the government and those of the 
Fund, the bigger the cost of IMF conditionality from the government’s view point. 
Since pre-conditions will have to have been implemented at the outset of the program 
the MC schedule will also start some way up the vertical axis. The greater the 
government's reluctance to pursue these policies, the higher up the vertical axis the 
MC schedule will begin. 
9  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, there may be circumstances in which a government, or at least parts of a 
non-unitary government, actually wants to pursue the policies favored by the Fund on 
economic grounds but is concerned about domestic political opposition to them and 
the political costs of pursuing them. The government may then choose to involve the 
IMF as a way of reducing the political damage that it would encounter if it were to 
pursue the policies independently. Here the Fund is being used as a scapegoat or to tip 
the balance in favor of reform. IMF conditionality is reducing the influence of 
powerful opposition groups whether inside or outside the government. The costs of   23
conditionality are negative and the MC schedule begins below and may remain below 
the horizontal axis, (MC2 in Figure 2). 
10  
 
As already noted, in assessing the costs of IMF conditionality two comparators exist. 
The first involves the policies that had previously been pursued within the country. 
These will probably have contributed to the economic situation in which the country 
is now turning to the Fund, and there may be expected to be a significant gap between 
these policies and those favored by the IMF. The second comparator is represented by 
the policies that the government would have had to pursue contemporaneously if IMF 
assistance were to be unavailable. With less external financing, these would be yet 
more adjustment intensive than those favored by the Fund. To the extent that 
governments turning to the Fund have revealed a tendency to underestimate the extent 
to which BoP constraints exist, they may also have a tendency to overestimate the 
costs of IMF conditionality in relation to the relevant comparator, which is the 
policies that would need to be pursued in the absence of the Fund.  These may differ 
from those supported by the Fund, but they may also have had to secure a larger 
correction in the current account. 
 
The perceived costs of conditionality may not only, however, depend on the nature of 
the policies incorporated in IMF programs. Even where governments favor similar 
policies, they may not favor having them imposed by the Fund. In this respect, the 
cost of conditionality is the loss of sovereignty over the design of economic policy. 
Other things equal, the greater the value attached by a government to sovereignty the 
higher up the vertical axis the MC schedule will begin. 
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The  shape  of the MC schedule then depends on how the costs of conditionality 
change over time and with the degree of implementation. Assuming that the 
sovereignty costs do not change, costs may fall if it becomes progressively easier to 
implement the later stages of a program. Adjustment may have been front-end loaded. 
In contrast to this, where the policies that are least palatable to the government have 
been deferred until later in the program the MC schedule will slope upwards, possibly 
at an increasing rate, as shown by MC3. These deferred elements are likely to be the 
ones to which there will be the greatest political resistance.  
 
Just as with the benefits, the costs of implementing an IMF program may turn out to 
be different from those that were expected at the outset. This could be because the 
economic effects are different or perhaps because political opposition to the policies 
incorporated within the program turns out to greater or less than anticipated. As a 
consequence the actual MC schedule may have a different slope or a different 
location. Furthermore, economic shocks may be another reason why the actual MC 
schedule differs from the expected one. Over time the MC schedule may shift. 
Economic shocks could be either negative or positive. An export shortfall would, for 
example, increase the extent to which imports need to fall in order to achieve a 
specific current account balance of payments target. Meanwhile, the related decline in 
economic growth would tend to reduce tax revenue below the expected level and this 
would imply additional cuts in government expenditure in order to meet targets 
relating to the fiscal balance. Compare for example, MC
e with MC
a.   25
 
 
   Marginal benefits and costs together 
 
 
The MB and MC schedules plotted out in Figures 1 and 2 are combined in Figures 3 
and 4. Figure 3 shows that governments will embark on IMF programs if the benefits 
that arise from the reduced adjustment intensity allowed by the extra finance 
associated with the program are perceived by them to exceed the conditionality costs.  
Figures 3 and 4 also show why programs may not be fully implemented. There are 
two possibilities. In the first case, illustrated by MB
1 and MC
1 in Figure 3, the 
government never intends to implement the program fully but only up to point A 
where, at the margin, the costs of further implementation exceed the benefits. It will 
have promised more reform than it intended to deliver in order to persuade the IMF to 
agree to the loan. By contrast, in the second case, illustrated in Figure 4, the 
government intends to fully implement the program at its outset, only to discover that 
the marginal benefits are less than expected or that the marginal costs are greater than 
expected, such that it becomes rational for it to abort the program before it is 
completed, as illustrated by the intersection between MB
a and MC
a, reflecting the 
actual outcome. 
 
FIGURES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE   26
Replacement programmes 
 
But what happens if a government fails to fully implement the program to which it 
has agreed; does this affect future access to IMF resources and how does this affect 
the probability that the current program will be implemented? Where future access to 
IMF resources depends on the extent to which past programs have been completed, 
implementation carries with it the option value of future access to Fund finance. There 
is then an additional benefit associated with implementation and, other things being 
equal, this will increase the degree of implementation. Where future access does not 
depend on current implementation, the probability of current implementation will be 
adversely affected. Indeed, it may be quite rational for governments to abort current 
programs if they believe that they can renegotiate another program with a more 
advantageous configuration of benefits and costs as shown by the sequence of 
programs in Figure 5. Here a program will be abandoned by a government if it 
believes that the net benefits of negotiating a new program exceed those of continuing 
to implement the existing one. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Implementation and ownership 
 
From the conceptual framework developed in this section it is possible to identify a 
range of factors that are likely to influence the degree to which IMF programs are 
implemented. The framework can also be used to analyse the notions of commitment 
and ownership that have begun to feature in the literature on implementation. Poor 
implementation has often been attributed to a lack of commitment or a lack of   27
ownership. These concepts are related but are not identical. Ownership implies that 
governments, or indeed societies as a whole, are persuaded that the policies being 
pursued within the context of an IMF program are appropriate or even optimal. 
Leaving to one side the question of sovereignty, which may be fundamentally 
inconsistent with conditionality, the degree of ownership will be reflected by how far 
up the vertical axis the MC schedule begins. Where Fund-backed policies are deemed 
reasonably appropriate by the country (widely defined), the ownership will be strong 
and the MC schedule will begin relatively close to the origin.
11 Although it no doubt 
helps, implementation does not require ownership. In the context of the conceptual 
framework developed in this section, implementation depends on the extent to which 
the marginal benefit of the program exceeds the marginal cost. A government will 
have an incentive to implement programs where there are large net benefits. This 
interpretation allows us to show how implementation may wane during the course of a 
program if actual marginal benefits decline and actual marginal costs rise.  A similar 
expected net benefit from a program will be associated with greater ownership where 
the perceived costs are lower. Figure 6 illustrates some possible scenarios. 
 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Not only does the conceptual framework developed in the previous section allow us to 
consider the factors that influence the extent to which IMF programs are 
implemented, it also allows us to identify policies that may improve implementation. 
The initial assumption is, of course, that it is a good thing to improve implementation. 
This presupposes that IMF programs are well designed and are, in some sense,   28
welfare enhancing. Should they be badly designed and have welfare reducing effects, 
as some critics claim, then failing to implement then will be beneficial. We do not get 
into this debate here but assume that the policy objective is to improve 
implementation. 
 
More significant in the context of this paper is the point that policies regarded as good 
by a national government may not be so regarded by the IMF. This follows from the 
observation that governments and the Fund will have different objective functions. 
Part of the purpose of the IMF as an international organisation is to dissuade 
governments from pursuing policies that may be ‘destructive of international 
prosperity’. Domestically designed policies have externalities and the role of the IMF 
is to minimise the external costs of domestically focused economic policy. Against 
this background our assumption is that the Fund – for good reason - is looking to 
improve the implementation rate of its programs. 
 
The analysis in section 4 suggests ways in which the Fund could manipulate its 
operations to induce superior implementation. In effect it should be looking for 
reforms that will shift upwards the MB schedule and/or reduce its downward slope, 
and at the same time shift downwards the MC schedule, and/or reduce its upward 
slope. 
 
The MB schedule could be shifted up by increasing the amount of finance provided 
by the IMF or by seeking to increase the strength of the catalytic effect associated 
with announcing an IMF program on other capital inflows. Any downward slope of 
the MB schedule could be reduced by strengthening the catalytic effect of   29
implementing (as compared to announcing) policy reform, and by modifying the 
structure of instalments such that implementation could be improved by switching 
completely to ex ante conditionality. IMF resources would become conditional on full 
ex ante implementation. But the problem here is that ex ante conditionality runs 
counter to the idea of IMF support being used to cushion adjustment; allowing it to be 
spread out over a longer time period than would otherwise be the case. See also 
Thomas (2002). 
 
The MC schedule could be shifted down and its slope reduced by seeking to close the 
gap between the policy preferences of the government concerned and the IMF. This 
might be achieved in part by the IMF making greater effort to persuade governments, 
and more broadly civil society, of the wisdom of its preferred policies relative to the 
alternatives. But a downward shift could also be assisted by the Fund showing a 
greater awareness of the political environment within which governments are 
operating. This could mean the Fund being prepared to make concessions in terms of 
the technical design of programs in order to accommodate domestic political 
constraints. The notion here is not to provide unconditional support, which opens up 
moral hazard problems, but rather to allow governments to have more discretion in 
designing the conditions upon which they will be judged (constrained by what the 
IMF deems acceptable). Perhaps it is better to implement a program that the Fund 
regards as satisfactory on economic grounds rather than fail to implement one that it 
regards as economically optimal. 
 
Again in terms of the MC schedule, discrete upward shifts associated with adverse 
external shocks could be offset by arranging equivalent upward shifts in MB (i.e.   30
additional resources) or by modifying conditionality in such a way as to shift MC 
downwards in a counterbalancing fashion. Implementation could be improved by 
‘shock proofing’ programs in these ways. 
 
An additional incentive to complete programs could be created by being more 
selective in the allocation of replacement programs. A benefit of full implementation 
could be that of keeping open the option of future loans from the IMF. Lapsed 
implementation on the other hand could be used as a justification for removing this 
option at least over a certain future period of time. Governments anxious to retain the 
option of borrowing from the IMF would therefore be under an incentive to complete 
contemporary programs; this might have the added advantage of minimising the 
probability that the option on future IMF loans would need to be exercised. It could 
help mitigate the prolonged use of IMF resources.  
 
The basic policy point is simple and straightforward. Governments are political and 
make choices about economic policies based on both economic and political factors.  
They will rationally continue to implement policies supported by the IMF for as long 
as there is a net benefit to them in terms of their own objective function. The IMF has 
the ability to influence some of the factors that impinge on the extent to which a 
government is able to achieve what it sets out to achieve. By manipulating these 
factors the IMF is able to affect the domestic choice of policy and thereby the extent 
to which programs agreed with the IMF are implemented. It is not a passive 




6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Evidence drawn from the 1990s suggested that many IMF programs were not fully 
implemented. This was hardly a satisfactory state of affairs even for those who had 
reservations about the design of conditionality. For those who believed that programs 
were basically well designed, poor implementation was of even greater concern. It 
reduced the effectiveness of IMF programs. 
 
In the early 2000s the IMF adopted a policy of ‘streamlining’ conditionality. The 
rationale was that implementation was poor because of a lack of ownership, and there 
was a lack of ownership because conditionality was excessive. At the same time as 
IMF policy evolved in this way a number of studies began to emerge that examined 
implementation from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. These studies 
frequently emphasised the political environment in which governments sought to 
implement programs. Political economy variables could frustrate implementation. 
 
This paper has adopted a similar political economy approach. It has provided a 
conceptual framework within which the decisions of governments may be considered. 
The message is a simple one. Governments will agree to and will implement programs 
for as long as they perceive the benefits as outweighing the costs. The benefits largely 
flow from the additional resources that IMF programs are expected to bring with 
them, while the costs are associated with the loss of sole control over economic   32
policy. However, the perceived benefits and costs of IMF programs change over time 
and the changing configuration explains why programs may be discontinued. To 
improve implementation the IMF needs to consider the structure of incentives faced 
by governments and re-orientate them in a way that encourages the completion of 
programs. While streamlining is in principle a step on the right direction, it may be 
too short a step. Moreover, it may conflate ownership and implementation when the 
two concepts are in fact separate. Further reforms may be necessary if implementation 
is to be significantly improved; and without a strong record of implementation what is 
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I – start of first program
II – scheduled end of first program
III – first program cancelled since actual costs exceed actual benefits at the margin.













(1) MB1 / MC1: reasonably strong ownership and commitment
(2) MB2 / MC2: weaker ownership but stronger commitment
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1 For a summary of the Fund's facilities see IMF (2000). 
2 For reviews of this literature see, for example, Killick (1995) and ul Haque and 
Khan (1998). Bird (2001) examines the extent to which the evidence justifies the 
claim made by ul Haque and Khan that IMF programs on balance work. He concludes 
that a case may be made that they work only in a fairly limited way. They may 
strengthen the balance of payments but do not appear to have a significant beneficial 
effect on inflation and economic growth. Other factors such as the poor record on 
completion, the tendency towards IMF recidivism and the lack of a catalytic effect on 
other financial flows suggest that judged against many of their own objectives IMF 
programs frequently do no work. 
3 See, for example, Ivanova, Mayer, Mourmouras and Anayiotas (2001). However, as 
the authors acknowledge, their study builds on earlier research directed towards 
explaining the success or failure of World Bank programs (Dollar and Svensson, 
2000). These studies are examined in some length in what follows. 
4 Of course if programs are badly designed, not implementing them could be a good 
thing. A pressing question for future research is the extent to which the success of 
programs in terms of final economic outcomes or the future evolution of policy 
variables such as fiscal deficits, monetary expansion and the real exchange rate 
depends on implementation. If it does, the focus of attention needs to be on improving 
the rate of implementation. If not, rather more fundamental questions may be asked 
about the design of conditionality and the rationale of IMF programs. What is the 
purpose of conditionality if it has no significant impact on economic performance? 
Some of the relevant literature is referred to later in the paper.   43
                                                                                                                                            
5 For an excellent early review of the concept and dimensions of ownership see 
Killick (1998). More recent reviews include IMF (2001) and Boughton and 
Mourmouras (2002). Drazen (2001) presents a theoretical analysis of conditionality 
and ownership that provides rigorous support for what are in many ways intuitively 
appealing propositions. Other useful discussions of the theory behind ownership 
include Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) and Khan and Sharma (2001). 
6 In this paper we do not include a full discussion of the roles of conditionality. 
Fortunately such reviews are fairly widely available in the literature, see for example, 
Bird (2001b). The focus here is much more on the extent to which conditionality is 
implemented. None of its various roles will be performed if it is poorly implemented. 
7 Either IMF support may be used to ‘tip the balance’ in favor of reform with the 
government publicly endorsing the policies advocated by the Fund, or the IMF may 
be used as a scapegoat for unpopular policies with the government deliberately 
distancing itself from ‘IMF policies.’ See Vreeland (2003) for a further discussion of 
the scapegoat role of the IMF. 
8 Bird and Rowlands (2002) provide a review of the theory behind catalysis and an 
empirical investigation of its quantitative importance. Although on its web site the 
IMF claims that the catalytic effect is significant and a key part of its overall 
institutional role, studies have generally failed to find strong empirical evidence of its 
existence. 
9 A countervailing point is that in the middle of a crisis and with a binding BoP 
constraint, whatever their preferences governments may be forced to prioritise 
policies designed to strengthen the balance of payments, and at the outset of IMF 
programs this could reduce the marginal cost of IMF conditionality, shifting the 
vertical intercept of the MC schedule back down towards the origin.   44
                                                                                                                                            
10 Similar negative costs of conditionality could exist where certain elements within 
government, such as the leader or the finance ministry want to tip the balance in their 
favor in an internal debate about policy. The Fund's involvement may 'strengthen the 
hand of reformers'; thus to some parts of the government IMF conditionality would 
have a negative cost while to others it might still be perceived as having a more 
regular cost. 
11 Conditionality will have a diminished role where there is strong ownership although 
it may still retain a signalling function and provide a way of dealing with the time-
consistency problem. As noted earlier conditionality may have a more powerful role 
where the government is a fragile coalition of disparate factions. Note also that 
conditionality will be an ineffective mechanism for overcoming time inconsistency 
and reducing the perceived chance of governments reneging on policy promises if its 
implementation is poor. For similar reasons poor implementation will weaken the 
signalling role of conditionality that underpins its supposed catalytic effect on other 
capital flows. 